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as such but also the mechanisms 
that gave rise to the vast divergence 
and modifications from such an 
ancestral bauplan — including 
complex behavioral traits found, in 
particular, in the cephalopods, or 
developmental processes such as 
torsion, the defining character of all 
gastropods (i.e., the rotation of the 
head-foot relative to the visceral 
mass). 
Accordingly, current attempts 
focus on the establishment of 
molluscan model organisms for 
developmental biology, which is 
facilitated by several genome and 
transcriptome projects that are 
currently underway. In addition, and 
following a long tradition, molluscs 
will continue to serve as important 
models in neurobiology, especially 
on learning and memory formation. 
Although the internal as well as the 
interphyletic relationships of Mollusca 
still remain debated, there is little 
doubt that future research will yield 
exciting findings on the development, 
evolution, phylogeny, and general 
biology of this uniquely diverse 
phylum.
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Intuitively, it would seem that we need 
to be aware of an object to locate it in 
our visual environment. Occasionally, 
however, we experience our actions 
as guided by the unconscious use of 
visual information. For example, most 
tennis players would agree that they 
sometimes hit a ball without even 
having seen it. Can we thus locate 
visual information without awareness? 
It may appear straightforward to adopt 
subjects’ reports about their conscious 
experience as the benchmark for visual 
awareness: a dissociation between 
awareness and the ability to locate a 
stimulus would be demonstrated when 
subjects deny seeing the stimulus 
while correctly guessing its location. 
This approach, however, suffers from 
potential response biases: Subjects 
may claim not to see a stimulus despite 
being partially or even fully aware of it 
[1]. We report that observers are biased 
to look at stimuli even when objectively 
unaware of them; that is, even when 
at chance level in guessing stimulus 
location. This demonstrates that the 
human visual system can control goal-
directed oculomotor behavior towards 
invisible stimuli in the objective 
absence of awareness.
Participants performed a visual 
search task while their eye movements 
were recorded. They could freely move 
their eyes to search for a Gabor patch 
rendered invisible with continuous 
flash suppression (CFS) [2], a powerful 
technique for reliably suppressing 
visual stimuli from awareness for 
extended periods of time (Figure 1A; 
see Supplemental Information for 
further details). CFS is thought to 
largely disrupt neural signals from 
the suppressed eye at early central 
processing stages, but may leave some 
subcortical processes and responses 
in dorsal visual cortical areas relatively 
preserved [2]. After each stimulus 
presentation, participants had to 
Correspondences discriminate whether the stimulus was presented in the left or right hemifield, 
reported their confidence in having 
correctly located the stimulus, and 
discriminated the Gabor’s orientation. 
We analyzed only trials in which 
participants were “very unsure” 
regarding stimulus location. Both 
location and orientation discrimination 
were at chance level (51.2% and 49.3% 
correct, respectively, one sample 
t-tests against 50%: both t(19) < 1). 
This null sensitivity to location and 
orientation demonstrates not only that 
CFS successfully eliminated subjective 
awareness but that participants 
were also objectively unaware of 
the stimulus. We computed dwell 
times as mean percentages of gaze 
positions directed to the stimulus 
areas and corresponding control 
areas contralateral to the stimulus 
with respect to the vertical meridian. 
Dwell times for the stimulus area were 
on average increased by 40% relative 
to the control area (15.4% ± 1.41 vs. 
11.0% ± 0.93 S.E.M.; paired t-test: 
t(19) = 3.22, p = 0.0045; Figure 1B; see 
Supplemental Information for further 
analyses and a control experiment 
replicating these results). Hence, 
although participants were unaware of 
the stimuli and even unable to guess 
their location, the stimuli nevertheless 
attracted their gaze. 
To the best of our knowledge, this 
is the first demonstration of a direct 
and on-line measure of goal-directed 
behavior towards objectively invisible 
stimuli. The notion that invisible 
stimuli can affect eye movements 
was first raised based on the finding 
that monkeys with visual cortex 
lesions could respond to stimuli in 
their blind visual field [3]. Empirical 
support for this idea came from 
studies in patients with lesions in 
visual cortex who performed saccadic 
eye movements towards visual 
stimuli they denied seeing [4]. Similar 
dissociations of awareness and motor 
behavior were also demonstrated 
in healthy participants who showed 
orientation-specific grasping towards 
visual stimuli rendered invisible with 
CFS [5] and prolonged fixations on 
unreported changes in complex 
scenes [6]. Our work reported 
here complements these previous 
findings. By continuously assessing 
participants’ eye movements, we have 
been able to reliably dissociate goal-
directed motor behavior from manual 
reports in a forced-choice task. Such 
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Figure 1. Experimental design and results. 
(A) Participants viewed the computer screen through a mirror stereoscope providing them 
with separate visual inputs to the two eyes. Eye movements were recorded throughout the 
whole experiment. (B) Dwell times were computed by calculating the average proportion of 
gaze positions on the stimulus and the control area across trials. Results for both areas are 
collapsed across positions. Error bars denote within-subject standard errors.an objective measure of awareness 
obviates the need to rely on subjective 
reports, which may underestimate 
the visual experience of observers 
[1] (for other bias-free measures of 
awareness, see, for example, [7,8]). 
Previous studies on processing of 
objectively invisible information 
measured either neural responses or 
used indirect behavioral measures 
such as priming or adaptation 
aftereffects. Whereas the link between 
neural activity and behavioral 
relevance has remained elusive 
[2], indirect behavioral measures 
typically assess whether responses 
to visible stimuli are modulated by 
preceding invisible stimuli. They 
are therefore limited by the short-
lived nature of unconscious effects 
and constrained by specific task 
requirements. By contrast, the present 
approach allowed us to directly and 
continuously monitor the behavioral 
consequences of ongoing unconscious 
processing. Importantly, dwell times on invisible 
stimuli represent a direct marker of 
goal-directed oculomotor behavior, 
because they quantify participants’ 
success in actively searching for 
the stimulus — despite complete 
unawareness of the outcome of this 
search. This dissociation between 
visual awareness and goal-directed 
behavior is consistent with the notion of 
separate cortical visual pathways, with 
a ventral stream supporting conscious 
vision and a dorsal stream controlling 
visually guided motor acts without 
giving rise to conscious perception [9]. 
Alternatively, eye movements towards 
invisible stimuli could be controlled 
by a subcortical circuit from the retina 
to superior colliculus, which relays 
visual signals from its superficial layers 
to saccade-generating neurons in its 
deeper layers [10]. 
Our findings demonstrate that in 
the objective absence of awareness 
the human brain can transform visual 
information into goal-directed motor output. Our approach of continuously 
recording eye movements during active 
search for an invisible target provides 
a window into the unconscious 
mechanisms guiding active exploration 
of the visual environment, paving the 
way for future research into neural 
systems underlying visuomotor 
integration without awareness. Our 
method arms researchers with a 
unique tool both for the investigation 
of cortical pathways mediating action 
and perception [9], and for studying 
phylogenetically old subcortical 
pathways that may play a critical 
role in directing an individual’s gaze 
to behaviorally relevant visual input 
[10] — in the complete absence of the 
individual’s conscious awareness.
Supplemental Information
Supplemental Information includes two 
figures and supplemental experimental 
procedures and can be found with this article 
online at doi:10.1016/j.cub.2012.04.046.
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